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Ideological Entrenchment and the Academy: An Undergraduate’s Defense of Religious
Belief in Public Universities
The literary critic and rhetorician Wayne Booth has authored, at least in my view,
one of the most intellectually satisfying and emotionally resonant memoirs of the life of a
scholar: My Many Selves: The Quest for a Plausible Harmony. The book is an
exploration in creative self-disclosure in which Booth tracks the distinct lives of his many
different “Selves,” those familiar agents like Vanity, Charity, and Ambition that goad us,
animate us, make us do things. Booth often presents these Selves in opposition so as to
highlight the kind of drama they enact in life, hence chapter titles like “A Pious Moralist
Confronts a Cheater,” “The Puritan Preaches at the Luster,” and “A Wandering
Generalist Longs to Be a True Scholar.” Booth’s reason for arranging his autobiography
in such an idiosyncratic way calls to mind the manner of perpetual self-questioning in
which thinking people, especially scholars, ought to engage:
Instead of tracing my life chronologically from an undramatic birth in 1921 to my
scores of undramatic experiences yesterday, I hope to engage you into thinking
hard about how my conflict of “Selves,” of “Personae,” of “Voices”—my “Splits”
both deep and shallow—create another kind of drama: the quest for a harmony, or
chorus, among those splits. (xi-xii)
Booth’s attempt to achieve a kind of discordia concors of his many Selves resonates with
academics because, like Booth, their lives are based explicitly on synthesis: synthesis of
old and new studies, synthesis of the work of one thinker and another; or, perhaps
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especially for scholars in the humanities and social sciences: synthesis of personal beliefs
or intuitions with those accepted by a discipline, synthesis of academic views and
political ones.
Such is the good life in academe: to be able to let one’s thoughts or views define
the content and direction of one’s work; or, to live one’s vocation. In my time as an
undergraduate at Grand Valley State University, it has appeared that this Boothian pursuit
underlies the work of many of my most fulfilled professors. For instance, Professor
Michael DeWilde of GVSU’s philosophy department leads a highly praised servicelearning program that sends students and professors to teach the humanities in prisons
and shelters; in this case, Scholar-DeWilde has harmonized with Egalitarian-DeWilde.
Similarly, one of my mentors, Professor Gleaves Whitney, directs a highly influential
center for presidential studies that promotes ethical leadership and provides mentorship to
developing student-leaders; here, Patriot-Whitney meets Ethicist-Whitney meets MentorWhitney. In each of these cases, scholars have, in pursuit of a plausible harmony of their
more virtuous Selves, done work that is at once innovative, successful, and fulfilling.
What a beautiful thing.
In my experience, however, not all scholars enjoy the same freedom to pursue
their vocation. I am thinking in particular of scholars who happen to be religious, or
whose scholarly lives might benefit from or be enriched by a certain religious character.
Inhibiting the pursuit of plausible harmony, the present nature of the academy renders
impossible the synthesis of a Scholar-Self with, for instance, a Christian-Self. Of course,
in lamenting this fact, I do not mean to suggest that scholars ought to push their religious
views on students or members of their field, or that a professor of Chemistry ought to
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speak on matters of theology and philosophy whenever she sees fit. Instead, the
argument that I wish to put forward in this paper is that the present ideological climate of
academe is not conducive to scholars at all making known, or at least entertaining as
plausible or valid, the notion of religious belief.
The thinking that informs this dominant view is evident. To most academics,
religious belief is an element only of private life, whereas the life of politics and, indeed,
scholarship, is public. What is more, the incorporation of religious belief into scholarship
at a public university would, in the view of much of the academy, constitute an indirect
imposition on and limitation of the free thought of students; after all, religious thought is
most commonly dogmatic and thus naturally inhibitive of the freeplay of ideas, or so the
thinking goes. In my essay, I will assert, by contrast, that the dominating school of
thought in the academy has established, in the place of genuinely free thought, a certain
orthodoxy and dogma of its own—one that ostracizes scholars, and for that matter
students, who are even privately religious. In sum, I mean to argue that the plausible
harmony that all scholars and students are entitled to pursue—that in fact they must
pursue in order to be fulfilled as thinkers and to allow for genuine freedom of thought and
speech—is necessarily frustrated in the case of scholars and students who are religious, or
who have religious ideas.

The Case of Catholicism in the Academy

The view I have thus far asserted requires a great deal of elaboration. So, for our present
purposes, I will provide myself as an example. Although, of course, I am not a working
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scholar, I qualify because I consider myself a product of my liberal education. I have
received a variety of awards for literary criticism and rhetoric; I founded and am the
editor-in-chief of my university’s cinema journal; I have given conference presentations
on literature and writing at both the undergraduate and graduate level; and most
importantly, I have developed what is commonly called a “thirst for knowledge,” but
what I think of as a desire to encounter, interrogate, and internalize what Matthew Arnold
calls “the best that is known and thought in the world” (428).
At the same time, I am a committed Catholic. I mean committed here in many
ways: committed to trying (but, of course, inevitably failing) to live a virtuous life;
committed to understanding the intellectual and spiritual tradition of my faith—in a
sense, to understand the “best that is known and thought” by Catholics; and at the same
time committed to the development and growth of my religion in dialog with culture, a
preoccupation only deepened by my liberal education.
The predicament I find myself in, just before graduation from my university’s
honors college with a 3.99 and plans for graduate school in English, is that I am forced to
repress, if I want to be anywhere near the mainstream, the expression of “Catholic”
thought in my work. Again, the expression of “Catholic” thought (I am convinced many
academics do not know what this is) does not mean proselytizing—I, for one, lack both
the sensibility and the character of an evangelist. Instead, I mean that, if I am associated
with Catholicism in the minds of other academics, my work will likely be dismissed out
of hand. This is the stifling of free thought that I will examine; as I have found, scholars
with tenure and good reputations fear it.
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Last year, I made plans with a fellow Catholic student, Elizabeth Balboa, to found
a Catholic forum in which professors, administrators and students would convene to
discuss the status of religion in the academy, the position of Catholicism in culture, and
the practice of reconciling progress made in the academy with religious thought. Our
belief was that, by establishing this group on a college campus, we would contribute to
the growth of thoughtful, intellectual religion—a kind that would put to rest the ugly
assumption that religion is nothing more than mindless superstition—and that also would
satisfy a need in both Catholic professors and students to discuss and debate the nuances
of their faith in open discourse. This kind of free debate, we believed, was the heart of
university life.
At the start, we knew of some scholars on campus who were Catholic and who
would be interested in joining: a few from English and philosophy, a couple from the
hard sciences, and a Franciscan sister in the writing department. The rest, however, we
had to find. So, Lizzy and I devised a plan: based on rumors and our own intuition, we
would find professors who were suspected of being Catholic and politely confront them
in their offices. This was of course an intimidating and risky task. From what we knew,
many of the professors would be lapsed Catholics and would thus need a little wooing;
still others would not be Catholic and would perhaps resent the accusation. Nevertheless,
we chose to continue.
What we discovered, meeting after meeting, was not that there were simply no
Catholic professors (far from it, actually), but that only a small minority of them felt at all
secure in being open about their religion. The reason for this fear, we also found, was not
a concern with the temptation to evangelize but instead was a feeling, deep in the guts of
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these professors, that their own academic reputations were at stake. Even the tenured
professors whose jobs were secure felt a pang of anxiety, the instinct that to be openly
religious in the academy would invariably mean ignominy and obscurity. Still more
perplexing was that, of the some thirty professors we found, almost all of them assumed
they were one of perhaps a dozen Catholics on campus. The belief most of them had
assumed, or that was inculcated into them, was that to be Catholic meant to be an
outsider. Not a single professor, in fact, knew of the critical mass of Catholics on
campus. The obvious truth to them was, instead, that their religious belief was an
anomaly, a fluke; this, in all cases, was what kept them silent for so long.
I recall thinking that this profound miscalculation on the part of the professors
was surely the result of some sort of ideological entrenchment of the academy, the root of
which I did not yet know. This entrenchment, I have now discovered, was powerful
enough to convince nearly thirty seasoned Catholic academics that they were, if anything,
profoundly alone.
In this paper, I will hazard a modest examination of the academy’s ideological
entrenchment by analyzing my own area of academic interest, the humanities. Thusly I
will reveal why the academy is unjustly hostile to scholars who are religious. I will also
briefly justify the existence of my Catholic group in a public, rather than private or
religious, university, and will then guide the reader into the work of my partner, Lizzy
Balboa, who will provide a more robust exploration of the necessity of the group and
others like it. Admittedly, this is a large task, perhaps much too big for two
undergraduates. So, I must take as axiomatic the words of my advisor, who said
comfortingly to me when I proposed the project, “there are two times in an academic’s
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life when he can ‘paint with a broad brush’: just before his commences his academic
career, and just as his academic career ends.” In the comfort of that advice, here goes.

A Certain Crisis in the Humanities

The humanities, as traditionally conceived, are the study of human constructs and
concerns; what defines their character, however, is their exalted status in the history of
Western thought. Typically the humanities are described as essential to human life and,
perhaps with the exception of Plato, are thought to guide the development of culture, the
growth of society, and are a good in themselves. Indeed, we ought to revisit Matthew
Arnold, who famously describes the function of criticism with respect to the humanities
as “a disinterested endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in
the world” (428); similarly, T.S. Eliot somewhat mystically describes “tradition,” or what
is otherwise called the Western canon, as forming an “ideal order” (538); Samuel
Johnson, before Eliot, argues that this “tradition” is not constituted by arbitrary
assessments of individual talent made by virtue of personal taste or trend, but instead is
comprised of works that “please many, please long,” and do so because they are “just
representations of general nature” (217). Notably, Johnson calls Shakespeare “the poet of
nature; the poet that holds up to his readers a faithful mirror of manners and of life”
(217). That is why, for proponents of the canon, Shakespeare is its center; he is to be
revered because, according to one famous living critic, he “invented the human”
(Bloom).
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Contemporary discussions of the humanities, when conducted outside the
university, usually take on this kind of rhetoric of appreciation. In a recent column for
the New York Times, David Brooks describes the humanities very confidently as that
which “cultivates the human core, the part of a person we might call the spirit, the soul.”
Interestingly, Brooks also laments the current condition of the academy for, in his view,
failing to affirm the profound human worth of a liberal education in general. In Brooks’
and many others’ view, an acknowledgment of the true worth of the humanities has, in
the minds and work of current scholars, been supplanted by a decidedly misguided focus
on esoteric theory and manifestly political concerns.
This anxiety about the politicization of the academy at the expense of what might
be considered the “authentic” humanities is not unique to New York Times columnists,
however. In fact, a variety of scholars point to the demise of the liberal arts as a result of
recent movements in the academy toward critical theory, or what Harold Bloom
pejoratively calls the “School of Resentment.” These theories, including poststructuralism and cultural studies, attack the Western Canon—that proud school of
Shakespeare, Dante, Milton et al. which constitutes a traditional education in the
humanities—for what they argue are its racist, sexist, altogether politically retrograde
underpinnings. Not only that, but proponents of such theories eschew the worn-out
rhetoric of the humanities that, in their view, deals in pseudo-profundities and
platitudes—rhetoric, like Brooks’, that claims the humanities simply and profoundly are
“the study of that which is most human” (qtd in Topf 231). To critical or postmodern
theorists, such claims are not only the remnants of a once effete and now dead rhetoric,
they are also the artifacts of an ancien régime that was naively convinced of the
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universality of its own truth-claims. Indeed, to many new academics, the old humanities
are not only dead—they are not worth resurrecting.
But, of course, the new schools have their own virtue. As a reaction against the
parochialism of the old guard, critical theorists inaugurated their own brand of
scholarship that largely had as its expressed mission political and social liberation. Much
contemporary critical theory, in fact, was nascent in the political firmament of the 1960s
and, as a result, sought justly to shed light on the woefully overlooked and ignored
literary and artistic work of the traditionally disenfranchised: women, ethnic and racial
minorities, the LGBTQ community. Consequently, some proponents of critical theory
aimed to “open” the canon, so that Eliot’s “ideal order” would include minority thinkers;
others, by contrast, simply attempted to dismiss the notion of the canon altogether
because it was politically suspect—that is to say, it was the product and property of “dead
white men.” Both of these views stem from a larger attack on the highly parochial
thought of the old guard, an attack that usually succeeds in revealing the ways in which
needlessly dogmatic and Eurocentric systems of thought have wrongly laid claim to
universal Truth.
In these ways, the current academic paradigm rightly seeks liberation for the
traditionally oppressed and, by extension, attempts to advocate for free thought in the
academy. My argument is that this project has, ironically, stifled free thought in some
cases. In the following sections, I will examine first the inaugurators of these new
schools and reveal how their thought challenges many of the premises of the religious;
second, I will expose how the rise to dominance of these views does not merely constitute
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a healthy challenge to religious belief but, in the present state of the academy, unjustly
ostracizes it.

Foucault, Derrida, Nietzsche

The theoretical underpinnings of the new academy are primarily anti-essentialist and antifoundationalist; importantly, they are interested foremost in challenging “truth-claims.”
Take, again, the example of the 1960s political firmament, which for many can be
encapsulated in the axiomatic expression “Question Authority.” Taking up this very
political project—that is, the contestation of author-ity—Michel Foucault composed his
seminal work in literary theory, the essay “What Is an Author.” In it, Foucault challenges
the very notion of the author, replacing him or her with what Foucault calls an “authorfunction.” As justification, Foucault argues that the very notion of the author tyrannically
limits the meanings readers can assign to a text. Foucault writes:
The author is not an indefinite source of significations which fill a work; the
author does not precede the works, he is a certain functional principle by which,
in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes
the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition,
and recomposition of fiction…The author is therefore the ideological figure by
which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning. (913)
The resonances with the political movements of the ‘60s are obvious—Foucault’s spirited
denial of authority, even over literary texts, is as strong as his use of a kind of rhetoric of
liberation, one that champions “free manipulation…composition…decomposition” over
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presumably the arbitrary and dictatorial limitations of meaning imposed by the presence
of the “author.” The heart of this evidently political project is the emancipation of
meaning from its historically accepted foundations—either, that is, the presumed
intention of the author or the necessary limitations put in place by a given hermeneutics.
So, the “proliferation of meaning” in the Foucauldian sense necessitates a kind of antifoundationalism that not only questions intellectually, but also holds politically suspect,
the notion of “authority” in a given text.
Foucault’s influence on the study of the humanities is undeniable, particularly
with respect to cultural studies and the New Historicism, a system of thought dominant in
literary theory. Because of such influence, Foucault’s anti-foundationalism seems to
have been conflated with his manifestly political projects, so that to support liberation
means, more often than not, to be anti-foundationalist. The way that such thinking
undermines the canon is quite clear—the canon, after all, is the tradition of dominant
authors, of “geniuses,” who guide interpretation and, in this sense, determine its limits.
By the same token, the ways in which such thinking contradicts the claims of the
religious is evident—as generally conceived, religious thought makes certain claims to
foundational Truth: e.g. the existence of a Deity and the “author” of existence, an
objective morality, etc. Alone, Foucault’s work constitutes a robust challenge of
essentialist, canonical, and indeed religious thought.
A contemporary of Foucault, Jacques Derrida was a thinker of immense influence
on postmodernism and critical theory, and is considered the prime mover of poststructuralism, a school of thought still en vogue in America. Derrida, like Foucault,
sought to redefine the nature of meaning and, more specifically, to destabilize it in the
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context of Western philosophy. In fact, much of Derrida’s work consisted of examining
philosophical “structures” in the history of the epistemé, or western science and
philosophy. Notably, his essay “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human
Sciences,” undermined the school of thought known precisely for examining such
“structures”—the aptly titled structuralism—that, up to 1966 when Derrida presented his
paper at Johns Hopkins and thereby caused a major shift in Continental philosophy,
dominated the academy. In “Structure, Sign, and Play,” Derrida critiques structuralism
for failing to achieve what he believed its proper project: that is, to divorce meaning
entirely from its historical foundations in “structures” of thought and discourse. In fact,
Derrida critiques structuralism precisely because it limits and stabilizes its own structure
by means of privileged concept, a “center,” that fixes all meaning in relation and prevents
the free play of thought. Of such structures and centers Derrida writes:
…structure has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by process of giving
it a center or referencing it to a point of presence, a fixed origin. The function of
this center was not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure—one cannot
in fact conceive of an unorganized structure—but above all to make sure that the
organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the freeplay
of the structure. (915)
Here, Derrida presents the concept of the “center” as that which limits (much like the
“author” in Foucault) the proliferation of meaning in a structure. Such centers or points
of origin exist precisely for such reduction or limitation, for by these means structures
maintain a certain coherence and orientation. When major paradigm shifts occured in the
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history of Western philosophy, it was usually the substitution of center for center—for
much of Western history the center was “God”; in structuralism, the center is “man.”
Derrida’s work is striking because of its capacity to destabilize knowledge and
discourse; for that reason, he aligns himself with the “destructive” philosophers who
preceded him: Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger. Derrida highlights these thinkers
precisely because they undertake projects of “decentering”—Nietzsche attacked notions
of truth and being in the epistemé; Freud undermined the common western notion of the
self, or consciousness; Heidegger laid to waste metaphysics and the notion of “being as
presence.” Of the three, however, Nietzsche seems closest to Derrida in project, for
Derrida claims that Nietzsche led him to this conclusion about the proper interpretation of
structure:
[it], which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms freeplay and tries to pass
beyond man and humanism, the name man being the name of the being who,
throughout the history of metaphysics or of ontotheology—in other words,
through the history of all that is history—has dreamed of full presence, the
reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of the game. (925-926)
Here, Derrida champions an interpretation of structure that forever abandons the quest for
the center, or for that which stabilizes, limits, and provides an origin or foundation for
being and knowledge. For Derrida, discourse is not a method to approach “truth” but
simply a forum for the freeplay of signifiers, for the proliferation of meaning. Derrida is
thus anti-essentialist and, in a profound way, critical of the very foundation of western
thought. The Western search for Truth, according to Derrida, is the search for a center.
Derrida implores us to abandon the search.
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Without hesitation Derrida undermines much of the “point” of the study of the
humanities, the discipline that takes “humanity” as its center. Likewise, Derrida’s
thought leaves no room for religious belief, for it too seeks a center in a deity, multiple
deities, etc. Indeed, if universally accepted, the power and scope of Derrida’s thought
would make religious belief untenable.
To finish, let us examine one last thinker: the inaugurator of the destructive
discourses and Derrida’s supreme influence, Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche is worth
dwelling on, for his thought permeates each of the anti-essentialist projects of the current
academy. Indeed, Nietzsche’s effect on Western thought was profound, as the
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre writes:
…it was Nietzsche’s historic achievement to understand more clearly than any
other philosopher –certainly more clearly than his counterparts in Anglo-Saxon
emotivism and continental existentialism—not only that what purported to be
appeals to objectivity were in fact expressions of subjective will, but also the
nature of the problems that this posed for moral philosophy. (113)
Nietzsche’s project, indeed, was to challenge the very foundations of Western
metaphysics in its presumed ability to reference the real, the truth, with its own symbol
systems. Not only that, but Nietzsche, unlike other would-be “destroyers” of Western
philosophy, saw the need to construct in the ruins of what he razed a new philosophy and
moral system—one, of course, that would completely do without conventional “truthclaims” like standard religious belief. Nietzsche proved, for one, that the metaphors
philosophers use to discuss and descant upon the real actually have no essential link to it.
Especially the Kantian notion of the “thing-in-itself,” which is considered the truest form
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of a “thing” and thus exists independent of human perception, is for Nietzsche not a
“truth” at all. In his essay “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” Nietzsche writes:
The “thing-in-itself” (which is what pure truth, without its consequences, would
be) is entirely incomprehensible to the creator of language and not at all desirable
to him. He designates only the relations of things to man and seeks the aid of the
boldest metaphors to express them. (454)
In particular, we here see that, contrary to much prior western philosophy, Nietzsche’s
position is not only that the “thing-in-itself” cannot be known rationally, but that the very
notion of “it” is merely a product of language. There are no “things-in-themselves,” for
the notion of “thing” is the product and property of language. Thus, we also see very
clearly Nietzsche’s influence on current strains of thought—for instance, Nietzsche
points directly to the so-called “linguistic turn,” evident in postmodernism and poststructuralism, which privileges humankind’s acquisition of language as the contingent
moment in the creation of the real. For Nietzsche, the “creator of language” has no
business with truth.
Indeed, Nietzsche’s critique of standard notions of truth is undeniably related to,
and of course the forebear of, Derridean thought and, by extension, the dominant thought
of the academy. The premise of most post-structuralism, for instance, is that language is
only a product of man and a system of difference—that is to say, it bears no actual
relation to the real. This argument renders all “truth-claims,” at least in their standard
form, indefensible. Nietzsche foreshadows this shift in the academy where he writes:
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and
anthropomorphisms; in short, a sum of human relations which have been
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poetically and rhetorically heightened, transferred, and embellished, and which,
after long use, seem fixed, canonical, and binding to a people. Truths are illusions
that we have forgotten are just that; metaphors that have become worn out and
sensuously powerless;…(455).
Nietzsche’s attack on “truth-claims,” or the notions that philosophers and theologians
have generally accepted as encapsulating or at least pointing to truth or the real, is here at
its most direct and most challenging. The philosopher’s stance, as we know, is that
“truth” is nothing more than a product and tool of language—i.e. of “metaphors,
metonymies, and anthropomorphisms”—but also that, having forgotten the role of
language in bringing reality into being, man has allowed himself to become foolishly
convinced of his own capacity to identify truth. To Nietzsche, the phenomenon of the
human, and thus of language, is a remarkably inconsequential affair in the history of the
cosmos and, in this light, has very little to do with universal truth. Nietzsche claims:
In some remote corner of the universe, the glittering expanse of countless solar
systems, there was once a star on which clever animals invented knowledge. It
was the most arrogant and deceitful minute in the “history of the world”—and yet,
no more than a minute. After nature had taken a few breaths, the star froze, and
the clever animals had to die. (452)
It is clear, first, that in this passage Nietzsche is rather hostile to the notion of man’s
primacy in the universe. What is more, the philosopher asserts that this false sense of
primacy is a direct effect of the invention of language, and further implies that
language—and thus, “knowledge”—constitutes humankind’s sense of history. For one,
Nietzsche puts “history of the world” in quotations, thereby calling the concept into

Hogan 17
question. To Nietzsche, it seems, the “history of the world” is a concept borne out of
man’s acquisition of language and, thus, does not originate in the real. Of course, this is
Nietzsche’s attitude toward truth-claims in general—after all, he commits the entire
paragraph to the implicit argument that all of man’s knowledge constructions are
miniscule, insignificant, and ultimately laughable when considered in the context of the
cosmos. Finally, Nietzsche’s perspective on the dubious relation between man’s
knowledge and reality—that is to say, the reality of the indifferent cosmos—first surfaces
in the passage. So, Nietzsche’s ultimate point is clear: language constitutes thought, and,
thus, is the basis even of the notion of the “real.” Humankind is then a slave to language,
not just in its incapacity to reference the real, but indeed, in its very creation of “the real.”
Nietzsche’s arguments, if accepted, are then not just devastating to the whole of
metaphysics but indeed to any systems of thought which make truth-claims. Of course,
the belief that words in some sense have a capacity to reference the real is the heart of
any common “truth-claim,” religious or not. Nietzsche’s, then, is the root challenge
made against religious belief and moral rationality in the current paradigm; it is the heart
of any solid attack on religion.
As I have claimed, Nietzsche’s influence on Derrida’s work was profound; given,
in addition, the importance of Foucault to much contemporary thought, it makes sense
that critical theory and those systems that dominate the academy would, in themselves,
pose a massive challenge to the old notions of the humanities and, by the same token,
religious belief in general. However, this challenge in itself would not constitute what I
have claimed is the hegemonic and ideological dismissal of religious belief in the
academy; indeed, honest and robust challenge is the essence of all principled debate and
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this does not constitute tyranny. Instead, what some recalcitrant scholars have posited,
and what I now accept, is that these systems now autocratically dominate, or for that
matter occupy as a kind of colonizer, the academy.

The Ideological Entrenchment of the Academy

I will state the present situation as I see it. The problem faced by scholars who are
religious, as well as by religious students who wish to engage wholeheartedly in their
studies, is two-fold: first, the now orthodox systems of thought I have thus described,
however subversive and “destructive” they once were, insist on masquerading as
heterodoxy and thus, somewhat paradoxically, are able to maintain ideological control;
second, this veiled orthodoxy gives rise to a kind of radical skepticism-cum-relativism
that, likewise paradoxically, is in fact absolutist and tyrannical in its dominance of the
academy and of the kind of thought acceptable at universities—it is, in fact, the only
standard by which any thought now can be measured.
Both of these claims require substantiation. Two scholars, both of whom are as
controversial as they are often cited, examine the academy as I have thus framed it; they
are the two Blooms, Allan and Harold.
In his controversial book The Closing of the American Mind, Allan Bloom posits
that the current academy, by encouraging the inculcation of radical skepticism and
nihilism in the form of post-structuralism and cultural studies, has in fact impoverished
the character and moral intellect of students. The academy achieves this end primarily by
failing to teach the Western canon and, further, by supplanting it with the currents of
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philosophy and literary theory that have been dominant for the past thirty years. One of
Bloom’s premises is that the supremacy of post-structuralism and cultural studies brings
about the titular “closing of the American mind,” the result of which is not so much a
dominant school of thought as it is a dominant ideology, a kind of dogmatism to which
most scholars and students are blind. Explaining the means by which the academy has
arrived at this point, particularly in the case of literary theory, Bloom writes of poststructuralism and cultural studies:
…it is the last, predictable, stage in the suppression of reason and the denial of the
possibility of truth in the name of philosophy. The interpreter’s creative activity
is more important than the text; there is no text, only interpretation. Thus, the one
thing that is necessary for us, the knowledge of what these texts have to tell us, is
turned over to the subjective, creative selves of these interpreters, who say that
there is both no text and no reality to which the texts refer. A cheapened
interpretation of Nietzsche liberates us from our increasingly low and narrow
horizon. Everything has tended to soften the demands made on us by tradition;
this simply dissolves it. (379)
Allan Bloom, perhaps more powerfully and confidently that any other critic, here
attempts to lay waste to the recent trends in continental philosophy and literary theory;
his rhetoric, indeed, is powerful and convincing in its swift dismissal of the dominant
schools of thought. But this captivating rhetoric notwithstanding, Bloom’s most
important insight seems to be into the recent ideological substitution of text for reader in
literary theory—this careful substitution, in Bloom’s view, divorces human knowledge
from its marriage to the belief in some form of objective, rather than purely subjective,
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reality. This move, in addition, ushers in anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism in
their current form.
Specifically, this shift from text to reader provides ample room for the tyranny of
the subjective will. As Bloom sees it, this tyranny in turn causes the ultimate dissolution
of the Western tradition in the academy; by extension, we can infer the dissolution of the
religious foundations of many students and professors. In Bloom’s view, we have thus
taken the final step in a wholesale departure from Western thought and have arrived at s
new form of intellectual autocracy in the academy.
Harold Bloom, perhaps the most famous contrarian in literary criticism and
theory, takes up some of Allan Bloom’s project in his examination of the hegemony of
post-structuralism and cultural studies. In his controversial book The Western Canon:
The Books and School of the Ages, Harold Bloom labels collectively each of the so-called
critical theories the “School of Resentment” primarily because, in his view, they
needlessly and venomously rail against the western canon. It is not so much that Bloom
does not know why they do so—he often admits, in fact, that these projects of the
“School of Resentment” are justified—but rather that he sees how their political projects
undermine the superior aesthetics of the authors of the western canon. For instance,
Bloom argues that the New Historicists (Foucauldians) improperly equate the work of
Shakespeare with that of his contemporaries, merely because they share the same
historical circumstances. Bloom cannot fathom such reductivism and blatant
philistinism—Shakespeare is clearly the center of the canon and the aesthetic superior of
his contemporaries.

Hogan 21
Interestingly, Harold Bloom, though a seemingly prideful, apparently choleric,
and shamelessly reactionary rhetorician, admits that his critical perspective is not only
overshadowed but necessarily smothered by the School of Resentment. Bloom admits,
first, that the political projects of the cultural theorists seduce many students who
otherwise would grow to appreciate the aesthetic splendors of Shakespeare over all
others. Readers get the sense, in fact, that it is difficult for Bloom to admit defeat; but
admit he must, for the ideological climate of the academy makes positively evident the
dominance of the School of Resentment. Entertaining the notion of resistance, Bloom
writes:
The unhappy truth is that we cannot help ourselves; we can resist, up to a point,
but past that point even our own universities would feel compelled to indict us as
racists and sexists. I recall one of us, doubtless with irony, telling a New York
Times interviewer that “We are all feminist critics.” That is the rhetoric suitable
for an occupied country, one that expects no liberation from liberation. (16)
Here, Bloom exposes what I have called the thinly veiled dogmatism of the academy.
His primary and, I now think, most insightful point is that the compulsory and normative
character of most theory—that is, the fact that scholars feel compelled to join new theory
or perish—reveals that the academy, which is supposed to encourage free thought,
instead is occupied by a kind of despot. Further, we can infer that this dogmatism, this
rigid orthodoxy that Bloom has shown, both because it masquerades as rebellious
heterodoxy and because it is the only system of thought proffered at universities, often
blinds students and amenable scholars to other ways of seeing and thinking. Thus, to
Bloom’s dismay, the School of Resentment saps the humanities of any claim to
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transcendence, universality or primacy in human life; at the same time, to our dismay, it
denies any foreseeable means for escape from its domination, especially for those who,
God forbid, are religious.
Independent of the Blooms’ analyses, I think it worthwhile to offer other
testimony—my own. One experience stands out as exemplary of the kind of ideological
climate that I have thus far inferred as the basis for many of my observations. In the
summer of 2013, I attended a graduate conference on southern American literature at the
University of Mississippi in Oxford. I was to present a paper I wrote about the notions of
authenticity and truth in Cormac McCarthy’s All the Pretty Horses. When I arrived, I
discovered that the hosts of the conference titled my panel: “Authenticity versus ‘truth.’”
The nuances of this title were striking: first, by using the curious preposition “versus,” the
hosts seemed intent on drawing out a contrast between authenticity and truth, as if
assuming one implied the denial of the other; second, the choice to put quotation marks
around “truth” seemed theoretically and politically charged, for it privileged the notion of
authenticity and implied that “truth” required a great deal of qualification and, indeed,
deconstruction.
My analysis of the title proved correct during the conference. At the panel, I
discovered that each presenter deconstructed the notion of “truth” in their essays,
somehow against the presumed authenticity of the characters in the stories they analyzed.
Perhaps because the hosts misread my abstract, I was the sole “true believer” on the panel
and thus became the de facto apologist of “truth” at the conference. Indeed, during the
Q/A session, I received by far the most questions, all of which had to do with my
thoughts on the character and nature of “truth.” I was, in fact, an exotic figure at the
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conference precisely because I treated the notion of truth unironically; I did not, that is to
say, hold it at a distance and do violence to it. The debate that ensued during and after
the Q/A session revealed two things to me: first, how little some proponents of the
current theoretical discourses know of the historical character of “truth-claims” in
general; second, how little I could actually do to disabuse them of the assumption that
truth is something that must always relentlessly, tirelessly, ruthlessly be deconstructed.
I was struck by another apparent truth during the debate: each of my critics
thought, indeed insisted on believing, that theirs was the minority view. Again we find
this belief, quite perplexing indeed, that the dominant strains of skepticism in the
academy are somehow, perhaps by virtue of their ostensibly subversive political projects,
heterodox. As I have come to conclude, the ideology of the academy maintains its
dominance in a backwards manner: that is, by employing a kind of rhetoric of the
oppressed, by means of which proponents of cultural studies can dominate academe
while at the same time appear fresh, novel, and rebellious. This is the primary method by
which, in my limited view, the current academic paradigm maintains its hegemony.
But how again does this hegemony stifle not just religious thought but the very
openness of religious people in the academy? To summarize and conclude, I will posit
three ways.
The first way, in my view, is that deconstruction is now a compulsory practice.
By that I mean that when one looks at a term like “truth” or “beauty” on the page of an
academic text, the instinct is to put quotations marks around it, to call it into question,
and to assure one’s readers that one is not so naïve as to believe in such metaphysical
spiritualism or Platonic delusion. The existence of this compulsion in not just the minds
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but the guts of most scholars propagates the academic climate in which the honest and
sincere proffering of truth-claims can only be done in religious universities, if at all. That
is to suggest, by contrast, that if such claims were made in public universities, then
religious professors and students would run the risk of appearing decidedly passé. Put
otherwise, if scholars discuss religious ideas without the necessary dose of radical
skepticism that is now a requisite for “intellectual” debate, they risk betraying, in the eyes
of the masses, their clear lack of “enlightenment” and allegiance to the ancien régime.
Second, I posit the exaltation of political liberation as the subversion of, rather
than product of, the study of the humanities. What I mean here is that, because of the
conflation of anti-foundationalism with the political agendas of today’s dominant
scholars, political liberalism and the pursuit of liberation is wedded to an anti-canonical,
anti-essentialist approach to the study of the humanities. Thus, if one champions the
canon, for instance, one must be a reactionary and therefore ought to be held politically
suspect. The stance, by contrast, that the canon itself can achieve for the oppressed a
kind of political liberation is untenable. A proponent of this impossible view, the social
critic Earl Shorris, argues that the canon in fact opens up the poor to the political life of
the Greeks: not, that is, the politics of casting ballots but, as Shorris explains, “in the way
Thucydides used the word: to mean activity with other people at every level, from the
family to the neighborhood to the broader community to the city-state” (“As A Weapon”
50). Shorris is a good example of a political liberal whose primary focus is, indeed, the
liberation of the poor. However, because he advocates for the virtue of the canon as the
means of liberation, his ideas currently bear little weight—hence the fact that, though he
rails against Allan Bloom like any good liberal, Shorris’s ideas are only partially and for
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that matter marginally accepted in the academy, merely for their import on certain
varieties of “service-learning.”
At the same time, as I have said, this conflation leads to the dismissal of all
religious thought not just as superstitious, but indeed as politically retrograde. That is to
say, just as to believe in the transformative power of the canon is now held politically
suspect, so too is the case for religious belief. What is most perplexing and frustrating is
that this position does not require any actual knowledge of the nuances of religion to
dismiss religious thought out of hand—one merely needs to know that religions make
truth-claims. For this reason, ideological critics and their students can become
increasingly ignorant of, and thus recklessly and oafishly hostile to, religious thought and
religious people.
Third and final, I would posit the axiom, recited as often by students as by
professors, that “everything is political.” This statement, in itself, is not false; the
problem is simply that it is reductive. Not only that, but the canonization of this axiom
allows ideological critics, again, to be wholly blind to the nuances of religious belief, the
particular ways in which it may animate the intellect, soul, and viscera. Indeed, if
everything is political, then one need only to examine religion as it relates to politics.
Further, since one need only to know that religions make truth-claims to know that they
are thus politically retrograde, one has further reason to categorically discard all religious
belief, regardless of its nuance and its basis in the intellect.
For the refutation of this axiom, I defer to one of my professors, Benjamin
Lockerd, who points out that the belief that “everything is political” is as reductive as
Freud’s notion that “everything is sex.” Certainly, Freud was not wrong that perhaps
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everything has a sexual dimension, but as modern psychologists have shown, this is
simply a partial truth. With a riff that I think puts the matter to rest, Lockerd simply
prescribes, “Professors today should try to hold these two truths in their mind at the same
time: everything is political, but politics isn’t everything” (46).

The Virtue of Religion in the Academy

I must now relate what I have thus far shown—namely, the ideological entrenchment of
the academy—to the Catholic group that my partner Elizabeth Balboa and I co-founded.
As I have implied, our organization would provide a means for the free discourse on
religion, independent of the compulsory skepticism of the academy, to which all thinkers
are entitled. But why, again, are they entitled to it? In my introduction, I discussed the
importance of pursuing what Wayne Booth calls “a plausible harmony” of one’s many
Selves, as if this was the supreme virtue of the intellectual life. Of course, it is not. I
meant only to suggest, of course, that to pursue such a harmony would lead to fulfillment
in the intellectual life, and that this was a good in itself. But again, there is another effect,
albeit indirect, of the pursuit of this harmony: namely, the synthesis of the intellect,
religious belief, which by extension would constitute the subversion of the hegemony of
the academy.
As I reflect on the state of the academy as I have thus presented it, I now realize
that our Catholic organization is, in fact, an image of the educational ideal that most
liberal education purports to realize. Indeed, our group constitutes the coming together of
engaged and inquisitive minds, separated not at all by hierarchy—students, professors,
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and administrators come together, nearly in secret, to discuss with equal passion the
intellectual issues that most dog them. For this reason, already our group has analyzed,
for instance, the evolving role of science in conceptions of the self, the changing
conception of religious freedom in the U.S. as well as its historical and philosophical
roots, to name just a few topics. The primary virtue of this debate is that it is open and
principled, passionate but not burdened by the small-minded dogmatism of some of the
weaker adherents of the current critical paradigm. For theses reasons, I believe the nature
of our group constitutes a legitimate reaction against the current academic paradigm, and
may very well succeed in superseding it where others have failed
But protests to my argument have inevitably been made. So, before we convince
ourselves of the virtue of instituting such religious organizations on the campuses of
public universities, let us again reconsider the one of our premises: that our organization
is necessary for honest intellectual growth, on the part of both students and professors, in
the academy. For that, we must turn to the work and research of my partner, Elizabeth
Balboa.
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